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ABSTRACT
A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO IMPULSE
CONTROL OF BROWNIAN MOTIONS
by
Robin Braun
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor Chao Zhu
This thesis considers an impulse control problem of a standard Brownian motion under a
discounted criterion, in which every intervention incurs a strictly positive cost. The value
function and an optimal (τ∗, Y∗) policy are found using the dynamic programming principle
together with the smooth pasting technique. The thesis also performs a sensitivity analysis
by analyzing the limiting behaviors of the value function and the (τ∗, Y∗) policy when the
xed intervention cost converges to zero. It is demonstrated that the limits agree with the
classic fuel follower problem.
The thesis next formulates and analyzes an N -player stochastic game of an impulse control
problem under a discounted criterion. In the N -player stochastic game, each player controls
an object. The objects are molded by an N -dimensional Brownian motion. A key aspect of
the formulation is that each player aims to minimize her total impulse control cost and the
total distance of her object to the moving center of the N objects. The interaction mandates
the players to closely follow each other's movements. The Nash equilibrium is characterized
and analyzed by a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. The case when N = 2 is
studied in detail.
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In this thesis, our goal is to control a standard Brownian motion, where any intervention
incurs a strictly positive cost. Doing this, means we have to select a sequence of separate
intervention times and amounts, making the resulting stochastic problem an impulse control
problem. Here, we want to minimize the total incurred cost over an innite horizon, while
considering a discounted criterion. In contrast to Helmes, Stockbridge and Zhu [1], which
used a linear programming approach to solve the problem, we will use the dynamic program-
ming principle (DPP) in combination with the smooth pasting technique to nd the answer.
This will give us an alternate approach to the problem that we can then try to extend to an
N-dimensional case later on in the thesis.
1.1 1D Situation
Let W and {Ft} be a standard Brownian motion and its natural ltration. An impulse
control policy is a pair of sequences (τ, Y ) := {(τk, Yk) : k ∈ N}, where for each k ∈ N,
τk is an {Ft}-stopping time and denotes the kth impulse time and Yk is an Fτk-measurable
variable indicating the kth impulse size.
Under such a policy, the controlled process is given by






where ξ is the accumulative jump amount up to time t. Note that ∆ξt := ξt− ξt− 6= 0 if and
only if an impulse τk occurs at time t and in that case ∆ξt = Yk.
Dene the running cost h and the impulse cost c
h(x) = x2, c(y, z) = k1 + k2|y − z|, (1.2)
1
where k1 is the xed cost for an impulse, k2 is the proportional cost and y and z are the pre-
and post-jump locations. For a given impulse control policy (τ, Y ) the cost functional is












where x = X0− is the initial position and α > 0 is the discount factor. The rst summand in
(1.3) corresponds to the running cost and the second one to the control cost for an innite
horizon. In other words, the controller will have to balance the desire to keep the process
near zero to keep the running cost low, against the desire to keep the number or sizes of
interventions low as to not infer a great control cost.
The corresponding value-function is given by
V (x) = inf
(τ,Y )∈U
{J(τ, Y ;x)} , (1.4)
where U is the set of all admissible control policies (more on that in section 2).
The goal now is to nd an impulse control pair (τ ∗, Y ∗) that minimizes the cost functional,
i.e. for which J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) = V (x) holds.
This problem has been solved in HSZ [1] using the linear programming approach. In the
following section, we will also solve this problem using the DPP to give a dierent approach
to the problem and then extend it to an N-dimensional version.
2
2 Analysis using the Dynamic Programming Principle
In this we will use the DPP to solve the problem stated in section 1.
Let's start by looking at the set U used in (1.4). One very important observation we can
make, is that we don't need to include any policies (τ, Y ) for which J(τ, Y ;x) =∞ for some
x, since our end goal is to minimize the cost.
2.1 Formal Derivation the HJB Equation
Before diving into nding the HamiltonJacobiBellman (HJB) equation, we'd like to make
an important observation about the value-function and it's associated optimal policy: An
optimal control policy, and with that V itself, should not be dependent on time, but only
on the current position of the process. This is because optimizing the cost after some time
t has past, is the same problem as optimizing from the start, just discounted by the factor
e−αt.
With that, consider a policy (τ̂ , Ŷ ) that immediately jumps to an arbitrary position y and
then continues optimally thereafter. We have
V (x) ≤ J(τ̂ , Ŷ ;x) = c(x, y) + V (y) ∀y ∈ R
Since the above equation holds true for any y ∈ R we have
V (x)−MV (x) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ R, (2.1)
whereMV (x) := inf
z∈R
{c(x, z) + V (z)}.
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Next, consider a policy (τ̃ , Ỹ ) and its associated process X̃ that does nothing up to a time
h and continues optimally from then on.







Further assume that the value-function is smooth, so we can apply Itô's Formula to the
process e−αtV (X̃t):










If we also assume that V ′ stays bounded (which is desirable, since we don't want the cost
to explode for large |x|), the second summand above is a mean-zero martingale. Thus, by













Plugging this into (*) yields

















V ′′ + h)(X̃s)ds
]
.
Dividing by h and letting h→ 0 gives us
0 ≤ e−α·0(−αV + 1
2
V ′′ + h)(X̃0)
0 ≥ (αV − 1
2
V ′′ − h)(x) ∀x ∈ R.
(2.2)
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Now, if we consider the optimal policy (τ ∗, Y ∗) at an initial position X0− = x at time zero,
it only has two options. Either it will immediately push the process, or it will idle. In the
rst case we get that the process jumps to some z ∈ R, so
V (x) = J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) = c(x, z) + V (z).
Since our policy is optimal, we also get
V (x) = J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) ≤ c(x, y) + V (y)∀y 6= z,
giving us in total:
V (x)−MV (x) = 0
In the second case, for h > 0 small enough, we get







Following the same steps as for (τ̃ , Ỹ ), we get
0 = (αV − 1
2
V ′′ − h)(x).









2.2 Finding the Optimal Strategy
Now that we know the HJB equation for V , let's think about how an optimal strategy could
look like. We already know that it shouldn't be dependent on time, i.e. it will always act the
same for the same position. This means we can split our space in two regions: The Action
Region A and Continuation Region or Waiting Region W (We push when the process is in
A and idle in W):
A := {x ∈ R : ∆ξ(x) 6= 0}, W := AC (2.4)
Pushes should always move the process out of A, since otherwise we would push again
immediately afterwards, incurring the xed cost twice.
Another observation is that our strategy should be symmetrical, meaning if it pushes to z
from a position y, it should push to −z from −y. This is because the running cost h(x) = x2
is even and the push cost doesn't favor one direction over the other. Also, since h is strictly
increasing for growing |x|, there shouldn't be a part of W farther away from 0 than A, i.e.:
∀x ∈ W ,∀y ∈ A : |x| ≤ |y|
So we should expect W to be some area bounded around zero and A to be the rest of R.
This implies there exists some y∗ > 0 (to be determined) s.t.:
W = {x ∈ R : −y∗ ≤ x ≤ y∗}
The last remaining question is how much we should push if x is in A. Let x > y∗ (so x ∈ A).
Since we want the optimal strategy, we should expect there to be some z∗ ∈ W (to be
determined) that is the optimal place to push to. In that case z∗ should also be the optimal
place for all x > y∗ since the push cost is linearly proportional to the push distance (factor
k2).
6
So, all in all, the strategy should idle in W and always push to z∗ for x > y∗ or, because
of the symmetry, to −z∗ for x < −y∗ (See Figure 1). So in mathematical terms, our strategy
(τ ∗, Y ∗) is dened the following way:
τ ∗0 := inf{t > 0 : |Xt| > y∗}
τ ∗k := inf{t > τ ∗k−1 : |Xt| > y∗} ∀k ∈ N>





Figure 1: 1D Impulse control strategy
Now we need to determine the associated value u(x) := J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) to the optimal strategy,
and with it y∗ and z∗.
From the symmetry we know that u(x) = u(−x) if x < 0. For x > y∗, we always push to z∗,
so u looks like the following:
u(x) = u(z∗) + c(x, z∗)
For 0 ≤ x ≤ y∗ our policy idles, so we want u(x) to fulll αu(x) − 12u
′′(x) − h(x) = 0 (see
2.3).
7




u′′h(x) = 0 ⇒ α−
1
2
λ2 = 0 ⇒ λ = ±
√
2α =: ±ρ
Which gives us the homogeneous solution
uh(x) = A1e
−ρx + A2e
ρx A1, A2 constants
Since h(x) = x2, we can nd the particular solution by assuming it is a quadratic function,
up(x) = ax





2 ⇒ (ax2 + bx+ c) = 1
2
2a+ x2 ⇒ a = 1
α

















A more general approach for cost functions c(x) other than x2 is to use the Zero-control (do






























































So A1 has to be equal to A2. Dening A := 2A1 lets us rewrite u(x) the following way:
u(x) = A cosh(ρx) +
αx2 + 1
α2
∀0 ≤ x < y∗
So u(x) is dened as follows:
u(x) =

A cosh(ρx) + αx
2+1
α2
0 ≤ x ≤ y∗
u(z∗) + c(x, z∗) x > y∗
u(−x) x < 0
(2.6)
Notice that per this denition u′(x) is bounded, which was one of our assumptions for the
value-function. Another assumption was for V to be smooth, so we want u to fulll this
also. For that we use the Smooth Pasting technique, i.e. set u and its derivative equal on
the boundaries:
u(y∗−) = A cosh(ρy∗) +
αy2∗ + 1
α2
= A cosh(ρz∗) +
αz2∗ + 1
α2
+ c(y∗, z∗) = u(y∗+)
u′(y∗−) = ρA sinh(ρy∗) +
2y∗
α




We now have two equations, but need to determine three variables (A, y∗ and z∗), so we
need one more constraint. We get that from the fact that we push to z∗. But if we are doing
a push, it should be the optimal one, so the following holds for an x > y∗:
∂
∂z





From the last two constraints we can already make an important observation: Since both
2x/α and ρ sinh(x) are strictly increasing functions, the only way to get a y∗ 6= z∗ is when
A < 0.
If we use the rst constraint of (2.7) and solve for A, we get:














Rearranging the other two constraints a little, we get:




















α · ρ sinh(ρy∗)
=
k2α− 2z∗
α · ρ sinh(ρz∗)
(2.9)
These equations have a unique solution and an analysis of the function A(z, y) shows that it
has a unique minimum less than zero at (z∗, y∗) (see HSZ VI-VII [1]). Unfortunately there is
no straightforward analytic expression for y∗ and z∗. It is however relatively straightforward
to get them numerically (see section 2.4).
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In the following gure, we can see a plot of u with specic parameters. Notice that the
tangents at y∗ and z∗ have the same angle φ (from u
′(z∗) = u
′(y∗)) and the function continues








Figure 2: Sample plot of the candidate function u(x)













u ∈ C1(R)∩C2(R \ {−y∗, y∗}) as given in (2.6) and satisfying (2.9) is a solution to the HJB
equation given in (2.3).
Proof. Per construction, we know that on W , (αu− 1
2
u′′ − h)(x) ≤ 0 is fullled. It remains
to check whether u(x)−Mu(x) ≤ 0. From the symmetry it's enough to consider 0 ≤ x ≤ y∗.
Since u is strictly increasing on R+ we know that for a z > x, u(z) > u(x), so the above
inequality is trivially fullled. So the interesting case is for a 0 ≤ z ≤ x:










≤ k1 + k2(x− z)
A (cosh(ρx)− cosh(ρz))
?








This inequality holds, since per denition of u, A is the minimum of the right expression.
So in W the HJB equation is satised. What's left is to check A, i.e. x > y∗:















= k2α− 2x < k2α− 2y∗ = α · ρ sinh(ρy∗) · A < 0,
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From the denition of u we can make three important observations. Firstly u′ is a concave
function on R+, secondly u′(0) = 0 and u′(z∗) = u′(y∗) = k2 > 0, which gives us thirdly
that u′ has its absolute maximum on R+ somewhere between z∗ and y∗. This implies that
u′′(z∗) ≥ 0 and u′′(y∗) ≤ 0. So in particular 12u
′′(y∗) ≤ 0.
So u satises the HJB equation. 
Proposition 2.4
For u dened as in (2.3) and (τ ∗, Y ∗) dened as in (2.5): u(x) = J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x).
Proof. Since u is smooth, we can apply Itô's Formula on the process e−αtu(Xt):



















































Remember that for this policy we always immediately push into W for any x ∈ A.
This means for one that Xt stays bounded, so the rst term approaches zero as t ap-
proaches innity. It also implies that the set {t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ A} has Lebesgue measure
zero. Furthermore, from the construction we know that for any x ∈ W the following holds:
u(x)− 1
2
u′′(x)− h(x) = 0. Which means the second term is equal to zero. Per construction,
u′ is bounded, so the fourth term is equal to zero. Also, for this control |Xτ∗k−| ≥ y∗ and














⇒ u(Xτ∗k−)− u(Xτ∗k ) = c(Xτ∗k−, Xτ∗k )















−ατ∗k c(Xτ∗k−, Xτ∗k )
]













−ατ∗k c(Xτ∗k−, Xτ∗k )
]
= J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x)
(2.12)
This nishes the proof. 
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Theorem 2.1 (Verication Theorem). Suppose (τ ∗, Y ∗) is an admissible policy and the
corresponding value u(x) := J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) with
(i) u(x) ∈ C2(R) and satises (2.3),
(ii) u′(x) is bounded,









u(x) ≤ J(τ, Y ;x) ∀(τ, Y ) admissible policies,
i.e. V (x) = u(x).
Proof. Under a policy (τ, Y ), we have



































Letting t→∞, the rst term is 0 because of the transversality condition. Since u(x) satises
(2.3), the second term is less than or equal to 0 and u(Xτk−) − u(Xτk) ≤ c(Xτk−, Xτk) for















= J(τ, Y ;x)
(2.14)
This ends the proof. 
As we can see, our u ts the Verication Theorem if we can show the transversality
condition. Let (τ, Y ) be an admissible policy and Xt the corresponding controlled process.







> K for some K > 0.



















































is asymptotically bounded below by eαtK̃. Jensen's inequality tells us
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]2 ≥ (K̃eαt)2 − ε,
which implies J(τ, Y ;x) =∞, which means (τ, Y ) wasn't an admissible control to begin with.
To summarize, we get the following.
Theorem 2.2. Let u be dened by (2.3) and (τ ∗, Y ∗) dened as in (2.5). Then u is the
value-function, i.e.
J(τ, Y ;x) ≤ u(x) = J(τ ∗, Y ∗;x) ∀x ∈ R, (τ, Y ) ∈ U
Meaning we have found the value-function and the optimal control policy.
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2.4 Numerical Solution for y∗ and z∗
Unfortunately, we can not nd a simple analytic expression for z∗ and y∗, but nding them
numerically is relatively straight-forward. Remember, (z∗, y∗) is the pair that minimizes
A(z, y) =





on the domain 0 < z < y. Since u′(z∗) = u














3 x→ 2x− k2α
sinh(ρx)
∈ R+,













Figure 4: Sample plot of f(x)
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So for each section f has an inverse function. This allows us to dene a function that gives
us all level sets (z, y):
















Using this, we get a new function, only dependent on a single variable that we need to
minimize:
Â : (0, t̂) 3 t→ A(p(t)) ∈ R





, we get that
p(t∗) = (z∗, y∗)







(a) sample plot of Â and its minimum
z∗ y∗
t∗
(b) t∗, z∗ and y∗ marked in a plot of f(x)
Figure 5: Plots of the numerical Solution
Based on this we created a python script to nd (z∗, y∗) and A given α, k1 and k2 (See
Appendix Python-Code 1-D).
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2.5 Comparison with the Fuel Follower Problem
Guo and Xu [2] discuss a very similar problem in their paper: The fuel follower problem.
This problem is very similar to our impulse control problem, with the only dierence, that
there is no xed cost k1. For their discussion, they also used a xed push-cost of 1, which
would mean k2 = 1 for our problem.
The optimal policy they found was to always apply the minimal push for the process to stay











+ p1(x) 0 ≤ x ≤ c
vf (c) + (x− c) x ≥ c
vf (−x) x < 0.
(2.15)
Where p1 is the cost of the "Zero-Control". Using the same running cost function as in this




We can see that both the policy and value-function are very similar to our result. The key
dierence is that Guo and Xu push to the border of the waiting region (to c), whereas we
actually push to a point inside it (to z∗).
An interesting question that that we can now ask ourselves is what happens when we let
the xed cost k1 go to zero, i.e. if we make our problem more and more similar to the fuel
follower problem. Intuition tells us we should expect the same result, meaning we should
move to a strategy that pushes to the border of the waiting instead of inside it, or in other
words, we should expect to see z∗ → y∗ as k1 → 0.
20





+ A cosh(ρx)− k2 · x ⇒ G′(x) :=
2x
α
+ A · ρ sinh(ρx)− k2
This allows us to express the constraints for u in (2.7) and (2.8) in terms of G:
G′(y∗) = 0, G





Since we can now express k1 as the area of G
′ (which is strictly concave) between z∗ and








Figure 6: k1 expressed as an area of G
′
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Since we now know that z∗ → y∗, this has to happen at the maximum (let's call it c to go




2 sinh(ρc)− (2c− k2α)ρ cosh(ρc)
(sinh(ρc))2
= 0
















































meaning the c's are the same in the two problems. Left to check is, if the value-functions
also agree. If we compare our value function u (2.6) with their value-function vf (2.15), we
can see that they are already similar in the last two cases, so left is to check if u(x) = vf (x)
for any 0 ≤ x ≤ c. In our problem we have u(x) = A cosh(ρx) + up(x), A = k2α−2cα·ρ sinh(ρc) and



















, so we get







+ p1(x) = −
cosh(ρx)
α2 cosh(ρc)
+ up(x) = u(x).
Meaning the two value-functions agree with one another as k1 → 0.
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3 N-players
Now suppose there are N policies, each controlling one object. From now on, let's refer to
such a pair of policy and object as a "player". The goal for each player is to stay as close as
possible to the other players.
This N -player problem can be formulated as follows. Let νi := {(τ ik, Y ik ) : k ∈ N} be the
policy for the ith player, where (as in the one-dimensional case), τ i1 < τ
i
2 < . . . are stopping
times denoting the impulse times for the ith player and Y ik is Fτ ik-measurable for each k ∈ N
and indicates the kth impulse size for the ith player. Now, let (X1t , . . . , X
N
t ) ∈ RN be the
positions of the players such that for i = 1, . . . , N ,
X it = x










with (X10−, . . . , X
N
0−) = (x
1, . . . , xN) =: x, where (W 1t , . . . ,W
N
t ) is an N -dimensional stan-








N be the moving average of ourN -players. As in the one-dimensional
case, the running cost function is h(x) := x2 and c(y, z) = k1 + k2|y − z|. The goal for each
player i is to minimize, over all admissible control policies ν := (ν1, . . . , νN) ∈ UN , the
following cost functional:




















The set UN is dened as
UN :=
{(
ν1, . . . , νN
) ∣∣∣∣ νj ∈ U jN ,P(∆ξit(x) ·∆ξjt (x)) = 0








∣∣∣∣ ∃ ν̂ control policy s.t. J j((ν̂−j, νj);x) <∞} . (3.4)
Here (ν̂−j, νj) := (ν̂1, . . . , ν̂j−1, νj, ν̂j+1, . . . ν̂N).
The condition in (3.3)
P(∆ξit(x) ·∆ξ
j
t (x)) = 0 for any t > 0,x ∈ RN , i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, i 6= j
means, we only consider policies where no two players act at the same time.
3.1 Nash equilibrium and HJB Equation
Denition 3.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A tuple of admissible impulse controls
ν ∗ = (ν1∗, . . . , νN∗) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the N -player stochastic game if for any
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , X 0 = x and any (ν
−i∗, νi), the following inequality holds:
J i(ν ∗;x) ≤ J i((ν−i∗, νi),x).
J i(ν ∗;x) is called the NE value associated with ν ∗.
The rst step to nding the NE solution is to derive and analyze the associated HJB
system. To do that, let's dene the action region Ai and waiting region Wi for each player.
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Denition 3.2. Player i's action region Ai is dened as
Ai := {x ∈ RN : ∆ξi(x) 6= 0},
and her waiting region is dened as
Wi := RN \ Ai.
Denote A−i :=
⋃
j 6=iAj the union of action regions of the other players and W−i :=
⋂
j 6=iWj
the common waiting region of the other players.
Introduce the operatorMif(x) := infy∈R{f(x−i, y) + c(xi, y)}. From the denition of UN
we know that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for any i 6= j. With this the HJB equation for the NE for the




αwi(x)− h(xi − x)− Lwi(x), wi(x)−Miwi(x)
}
= 0, ∀x ∈ W−i,
∂
∂xj
wi(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ Aj, j 6= i,
(3.5)







The derivation of (3.5) can be illustrated with the case of N = 2. In this case, if x =
(x1, x2) ∈ A2 and ∆ξ2∗ 6= 0. By the denition of the NE, player one is not expected to suer
a loss for otherwise she will have incentive to take action. Thus
w1(x1, x2) = w
1(x1, x2 + ∆ξ
2∗).
Letting ∆ξ2∗ → 0, we have ∂
∂x2
w1(x) = 0 for x ∈ A2.
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If x ∈ W2, ∆ξ2∗(x) = 0, then the control problem for player one becomes a classical single
















= 0, ∀x ∈ W2.
3.2 Verication Theorem
Theorem 3.3 (Verication Theorem). Suppose ν ∗ = (ν1∗, . . . , νN∗) is an admissible policy
and the corresponding value wi(x) := J i(ν ∗;x) satises
(i) the function wi(x) ∈ C2(W−i) and satises (3.5),
(ii) for any admissible policy νi, the controlled dynamic (X−i∗t , X
i
t) under the policy
(ν−i∗, νi) stays in W−i for all t ≥ 0 P-a.s.,
(iii) there exists a function ui(x) ∈ C2(RN) such that ui(x) = wi(x) on W−i,



























Then ν ∗ is a NE with value ui.
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Proof. Under the policy (ν−i∗, νi), we have
X it = x
i +W it + ξ
i
t, t ≥ 0,
and for j 6= i
Xj∗t = x
j +W jt + ξ
j∗
t , t ≥ 0.





























































































X it −X t
)
.
Since Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j, we have X−i∗τ ik = X
−i∗
τ ik−















































































Since h, c ≥ 0, we can use the monotone convergence theorem and the transversality condition

























This nishes the proof. 
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3.3 Finding the Optimal Policies
Now that we have the Verication Theorem, we can start nding the policies for our players.
Let's try a similar approach to the one-dimensional case, meaning our player idles as long
as she stays within a certain distance of the moving average and jumps closer to it, if she is
farther away.
Note 3.4. The distance of a player to the moving average can also be expressed in terms of
the distance from the player to the average of the other players (excluding the player itself):
























Using this, we can also formulate that threshold in terms of the distance to the other
players' average. So we can say there exists some constant yN∗ > 0, s.t. we can decompose














x ∈ RN : dNi (x) > yN∗
}
,
dNi (x) := x
i − x−i.
(3.9)
Qi is a partition of RN . We need that, since we want to avoid any two players sharing an
action region, which could happen if we just used Ai = E
−
i ∪E+i . This is especially noticeable





(x1 − x2) = −1
2
(x2 − x1) = −d22(x1, x2)
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i.e. we use the rule: Should more than one player be in their "action region", the one furthest
from the center pushes rst. If multiple players have the biggest distance, the one with the
highest index pushes rst.
On the common waiting region of all players W =
⋂N
i=1Wi, every policy idles, so every
candidate solution wi should satisfy:
αwi(x)− h(x)− Lwi(x) = 0
To solve this, we start by nding the homogeneous solution wih to αw
i
h(x)−Lwih(x) = 0, by






















2α · (N − 1)
N
=: ±ρN




ρN ·diN (x) + CiNe
−ρN ·diN (x),








2 + bdiN(x) + c.
αwip(x) = h(x



















































(N−1)2 , so a =
1
αN
and c = N
3
α2N (N−1)3
. Then we have





ρN ·diN (x) + CiNe








for any x ∈ W .
Let's take a closer look at the case N = 2. Because of the above mentioned symmetry, we








∣∣∣∣ ∣∣d22(x)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣d21(x)∣∣ } = R2.
In other words, player 2 does all the work, while player one always idles. This also gives us
W1 = R2, A1 = ∅,
W2 =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : |x2 − x1| ≤ y2∗
}
, A2 = E−2 ∪ E+2
E−2 =
{




(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : x2 − x1 > y2∗
}
To nd the NE for this partition, let's start with nding player two's candidate function w2.
Notice that, since player two is doing all the work, player one's action region is the empty
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set, so the second condition in (3.5), i.e.
∂
∂x1
w2(x1, x2) = 0 ∀(x1, x2) ∈ A1, is actually no
constraint at all. This means we only have to consider the rst part, making this problem
very similar to the one-dimensional case.
From (3.11), we already know how w2 has to look like on W2 = W . Furthermore, from the
symmetry of this partition, we get w2(x) = w2(y) if |d22(x)| = |d22(y)|. This also gives us that
A22 = B
2
















∀(x1, x2) ∈ W2. (3.12)
On A2, we know that player two pushes, so
w2(x1, x2) = w2(x1, x1 − z2∗) + c(x2, x1 − z2∗) ∀(x1, x2) ∈ E−2 ,
w2(x1, x2) = w2(x1, x1 + z2∗) + c(x
2, x1 + z2∗) ∀(x1, x2) ∈ E+2 ,



















z2∗ − k2 = 0.
Furthermore, using the smooth-pasting technique along x2 = x1 + y2∗, we get












+ c (y2∗, z2∗) = w
2(x1, x1 + y2∗+)
∂
∂x2
wi(x1, x1 + y2∗−) = ρ2A22 sinh(ρ2y2∗) +
2
α2
y2∗ = k2 =
∂
∂x2
w2(x1, x1 + y2∗+)
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α · ρ sinh(ρy∗)
=
k2α− 2z∗
α · ρ sinh(ρz∗)
,
we can see that they are very similar and can be solved the same way. Unfortunately, as
with the one dimensional case, there is no simple analytic expression for A22, z2∗ and y2∗, but
nding the solution numerically works nearly the same way as for the one dimensional case
(See Appendix Python-Code N-D). All put together we get
w2(x1, x2) =

w2(x1, x1 − z2∗) + c(x2, x1 − z2∗) (x1, x2) ∈ E−2 ,





(x1, x2) ∈ W2,
w2(x1, x1 + z2∗) + c(x
2, x1 + z2∗) (x
1, x2) ∈ E+2 .
(3.13)
With u2(x1, x2) = A22 cosh (
√





, we can check as in the one
dimensional case that w2 fullls the conditions in the Verication Theorem, meaning to nd
a NE solution, all that's left is to nd w1.
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As with w2, we know w1 on W is given by (3.11) and with A12 := B12/2 and the symmetry
we get











∀(x1, x2) ∈ W . (3.14)
On A2 we know that player two pushes and from (3.5) we know that player one incurs no
cost from that push. So we should expect
w1(x1, x2) = w1(x1, x1 − z2∗) ∀(x1, x2) ∈ E−2 ,
w1(x1, x2) = w1(x1, x1 + z2∗) ∀(x1, x2) ∈ E+2 .
Matching the values along x2 = x1 + y2∗, we get












= w1(x1, x1 + y2∗+)
Solving for A12 gives us the last missing variable:
A12 =
(z22∗ − y22∗) /α2
cosh(ρ2y2∗)− cosh(ρ2z2∗)
.
So the nal expression for w1 is
w1(x1, x2) =

w1(x1, x1 − z2∗) (x1, x2) ∈ E−2 ,





(x1, x2) ∈ W2,
w1(x1, x1 + z2∗) (x
1, x2) ∈ E+2 .
(3.15)
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Let's check if w1 satises the HJB equation (3.5).
Per construction only w1(x1, x2)−M1w1(x1, x2) ≤ 0 on W is left to check. Let q ∈ R, then
we need to check whether
w1(x1, x2)− w1(x1 + q, x2)− c(x1, x1 + q) ≤ 0.
Suppose (x1 + q, x2) ∈ E+2 , then w1(x1 + q, x2) = w1(x1 + q, x1 + q+z2∗). From the denition
of A12 and the symmetry of w
1 around x1 = x2, we get
w1(x1 + q, x1 + q + z2∗) = w
1(x1 + q, x1 + q + y2∗) = w
1(x2 − y2∗, x2).
But since (x1 + q, x2) ∈ E+2 , we also know that x1 + q < x2 − y2∗ ≤ x1, so
w1(x1, x2)−w1(x1 + q, x2)− c(x1, x1 + q) < w1(x1, x2)−w1(x2− y2∗, x2)− c(x1, x2− y2∗).
Using the same argument for (x1, x2) ∈ E−2 , we see that it is enough to check any q, s.t.
(x1 + q, x2) ∈ W . Then


















α · (x1 + q − x2)
)
+













k1 + k2|z − y|+ z
2−y2
α2
cosh (ρ2y)− cosh (ρ2z)




2 is the minimum of the right expression (as in the one
dimensional case).
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Now suppose |z| > |y|. This case is more tricky to show and we actually have no analytic
proof yet, which will have to be done in a future work. For now, we veried that the
inequality holds numerically and will assume its correctness from here on.
From here it is straightforward to check that w1 satises the Verication Theorem, so we
have found a possible NE Solution. Let
ν1∗ := "Zero-control" , ν2∗ := (τ 2∗k , Y
2∗
k ),
τ 2∗0 := inf
{
t > 0 : |X2t −X1t | > y2∗
}
τ 2∗k := inf
{
t > τ 2∗k−1 : |X2t −X1t | > y∗
}
∀k ∈ N>















Figure 7: Possible NE impulse control strategy for 2D
Theorem 3.5. Let ν ∗ = (ν1∗, ν2∗) dened as in (3.16), then ν is a NE with values w1 and













Figure 8: Sample plot of w1 and w2 - NE solutions
In the above gure, we can see a sample plot of w1 and w2. The gure in the next page
shows a cross-section of the above plot for (x1 = −x2) that shows what inuence z2∗ and y2∗
have on the functions.
As we can see in both plots, w1 < w2 everywhere. This might seem unexpected at rst, but
does make sense. Player one never has to push, so the total cost should be lower than for
















Figure 9: Cross section of w1 and w2 - NE solutions
Because of the symmetry in the two dimensional case, we actually have more than one
NE solution. One that we can immediately nd, is if we ip the roles of player one and
player two, so now player one always pushes and player two always idles. This solution also
corresponds to the partition Q1 = R2, Q2 = ∅.
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3.4 Outlook
Another partition that might be interesting to analyze in a future work is
Q1 =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣ x1 > x2}
Q2 =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2





Figure 10: Partition of R2
This partition would result in both player one and player two doing pushes, with player
one to the right of x1 = x2− y2∗ and player one to the left of x2 = x1− y2∗. This also means
that we would loose the inherent symmetry the problem had until now, meaning the constant
Bi2 and C
i
3 in (3.11) would most likely not be the same anymore. A possible cross-section of
the corresponding w1 and w2 functions could look as in Figure 11.
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w1(x,−x)w2(x,−x)
Figure 11: Possible shape of cross section of w1 and w2 for non-symmetric strategy
After nishing with the two dimensional case, the next step is of course to get a general
NE solution for the N-player case. One thing that could cause problems there, compared to
before is that Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅ in general, meaning the action-regions share borders. Matching
the dierent functions along those borders could prove dicult. Another thing to consider,
is that pushes from one player may cause another player to react. Consider the following












y5∗), then the distance of player
one to the others is:

















= −y5∗ − 0.1 < −y5∗.
So player one has incentive to act and makes a push toward the center. But this causes
player two to slip out of the waiting region, resulting in a push from player two. This goes
against the assumption that actions of other players should not result in a disadvantage and
denitely warrants a closer look in a future work.
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Appendix Python-Code 1-D
1 import numpy as np
2 import s c ipy . opt imize as opt
3 import matp lo t l i b . pyplot as p l t
4
5 # se t as needed
6 k1 = 10 # > 0
7 k2 = 10 # > 0
8 alpha = 0 .1 # > 0
9
10 rho = np . sq r t (2* alpha )
11
12 de f A( z , y ) :
13 t ry :
14 re turn ( k1 + k2*np . abs (y=z ) + ( z **2 = y**2) / alpha ) /(np . cosh ( rho*y ) =
↪→ np . cosh ( rho*z ) )
15 except Overf lowError :
16 re turn np . i n f
17
18 de f f ( x ) :
19 re turn (2*x = k2* alpha ) /(np . s inh ( rho*x ) )
20
21 hat_x = opt . minimize_scalar ( lambda x : =f ( x ) ) . x
22 hat_t = f (hat_x )
23
24 de f inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=True ) :
25 # method : f i nd zero f o r f ( x ) = t
26 i f left_of_hat_x :
27 # we know i t has to c r o s s zero between 0 and hat_x
28 bounds = [ 0 , hat_x ]
29 e l s e :
30 # f ind the zero c r o s s i n g
42
31 b1 , b2 = 0 , 10
32 whi le f ( hat_x + b2 ) >= t :
33 b1 = b2
34 b2 *= 2
35 bounds = [ hat_x + b1 , hat_x + b2 ]
36 re turn opt . brentq ( lambda x : f ( x ) = t , bounds [ 0 ] , bounds [ 1 ] )
37
38 de f P( t ) :
39 p_z = inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=True )
40 p_y = inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=False )
41
42 re turn (p_z , p_y)
43
44 de f hat_A( t ) :
45 z , y = P( t )
46 re turn A( z , y )
47
48 #pr in t r e s u l t
49 t_star = opt . minimize_scalar (hat_A , bounds=(0 , hat_t ) , method=' bounded ' ) . x
50 z_star , y_star = P( t_star )
51 pr in t ( f 'A = {hat_A( t_star ) } ; z* = {z_star } ; y*={y_star} ' )
52
53 #plo t r e s u l t
54 t s = np . arange (0 , 1 , 0 . 005 ) * hat_t
55 r e s = [ hat_A( t ) f o r t in t s ]
56 p l t . p l o t ( ts , res , '= ' , [ t_star ] , [A( z_star , y_star ) ] , ' ro ' )
57 p l t . show ( )
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1 import numpy as np
2 import s c ipy . opt imize as opt
3 import matp lo t l i b . pyplot as p l t
4
5 # se t as needed
6 k1 = 10 # > 0
7 k2 = 10 # > 0
8 alpha = 0 .1 # > 0
9 N = 2 # > 1
10
11 rhoN = np . sq r t (2* alpha * (N=1)/N)
12 alphaN = ( alpha * N**2) /(N=1)**2
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16 re turn ( k1 + k2*np . abs (y=z ) + ( z **2 = y**2) /alphaN ) /(np . cosh ( rhoN*y ) =
↪→ np . cosh ( rhoN*z ) )
17 except Overf lowError :
18 re turn np . i n f
19
20 de f f ( x ) :
21 re turn (2*x = k2*alphaN ) /(np . s inh ( rhoN*x ) )
22
23 hat_x = opt . minimize_scalar ( lambda x : =f ( x ) ) . x
24 hat_t = f (hat_x )
25
26 de f inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=True ) :
27 # method : f i nd zero f o r f ( x ) = t
28 i f left_of_hat_x :
29 # we know i t has to c r o s s zero between 0 and hat_x
30 bounds = [ 0 , hat_x ]
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31 e l s e :
32 # f ind the zero c r o s s i n g
33 b1 , b2 = 0 , 10
34 whi le f ( hat_x + b2 ) >= t :
35 b1 = b2
36 b2 *= 2
37 bounds = [ hat_x + b1 , hat_x + b2 ]
38 re turn opt . brentq ( lambda x : f ( x ) = t , bounds [ 0 ] , bounds [ 1 ] )
39
40 de f P( t ) :
41 p_z = inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=True )
42 p_y = inv_f ( t , left_of_hat_x=False )
43
44 re turn (p_z , p_y)
45
46 de f hat_A( t ) :
47 z , y = P( t )
48 re turn A( z , y )
49
50 #pr in t r e s u l t
51 t_star = opt . minimize_scalar (hat_A , bounds=(0 , hat_t ) , method=' bounded ' ) . x
52 z_star , y_star = P( t_star )
53 pr in t ( f 'A = {hat_A( t_star ) } ; z* = {z_star } ; y*={y_star} ' )
54
55 #plo t r e s u l t
56 t s = np . arange (0 , 1 , 0 . 005 ) * hat_t
57 r e s = [ hat_A( t ) f o r t in t s ]
58 p l t . p l o t ( ts , res , '= ' , [ t_star ] , [A( z_star , y_star ) ] , ' ro ' )
59 p l t . show ( )
45
